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those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction  
Although the Army manuals (FM 3-24 Counter Terrorism, FM 3-05.30 PSYOP, and FM 3-13/JP 
3-13 Information Operations) cover issues that are related to fighting an insurgent force, none of 
these manuals address the social mobilization concept of framing. Framing has a direct 
application to U.S. military operations in Iraq. The concept defines the battle for opposition 
leaders to garner support from the populace in order to deny the established power or regime the 
ability to counter opposition through force or policy. The application of framing to counter-
insurgency (COIN) is appropriate and U.S. military doctrine should adopt and integrate the 
concept in order to guide maneuver commanders in non-kinetic and kinetic COIN operations. 
More specifically, framing pertains to the Information Operations (IO) battlefield, an aspect of 
military planning formerly placed on the conventional back burner but has now come to the 
forefront of U.S. military operations where ‘taking the hill’ has become replaced by policing streets. 
Should the U.S. military doctrine continue to neglect framing in its doctrinal and operational 
writings, it will be denying a conceptual resource to its troops that can help define the information 
battlefield, in which conventional armies traditionally are lacking, when conducting counter 
insurgency operations.  
In this article, I argue that the concept of framing, as defined by the social mobilization theory 
framework (SMT), can and should be applied to U.S. military counter insurgency (COIN) 
operations. Framing provides an academic focus of study that could increase Soldiers’ and 
Marines’ concept operations within the COIN environment. The concept of framing immediately 
focuses the U.S. military leadership on the enemy’s plan to secure the support of the population, 
which is the widely accepted center of gravity in the COIN fight.[1] This paper will utilize U.S. 
Army and USMC operations in al Anbar province, Iraq as an example for three reasons: because 
of the organizational requirement to cooperate between military branches, the current successes 
of IO in this theatre, and the detailed focus of the commanders to the IO fight from 2003-2007 
which yields more data focused on framing.  
This article is organized in three sections: first, a definition of framing and an outline of the current 
academic work on the subject. Second, this paper covers a brief application of framing to Islamist 
Movements, such as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Third, I provide an account of actions in Al Anbar 
Province from 2004-2007 in two vignettes: the second battle of Fallujah (2004), 1st BCT 1st AD 
(2005-6). The conclusion of this paper finds that the application of a framing lens can aid the U.S. 
military in its operations and help prevent an insurgency, as well as focus Coalition Forces’ (CF) 
interactions with the populace. 
Framing  
Framing is a cognitive theory that originally came to sociology from psychiatry. Zald defines 
frames as “the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render 
or case behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action.”[2] 
Johnston defined it the most succinctly when he labeled framing as a function “much the same 
way as a frame around a picture: attention gets focused on what is relevant and important and 
away from extraneous items in the field of view.”[3] Acts of oppression or injustice must be 
illuminated for the population to mobilize into a movement, or an insurgency, which means that 
people must be convinced of the necessity to move against the regime, occupational forces, or 
government. Thus collective action frames must not only define the problem, but what must be 
done about it, and why it must be done.  
The concept of framing is relatively new to social mobilization theory. Unlike its more quantitative, 
resource-based mobilization theoretical predecessors, the concept of framing acknowledges that 
there are more subjective forces to social mobilization at work. Within the theoretical work 
surrounding the concept of framing, the academic study is clearly led by Benford and Snow. Their 
work on framing illuminated the cultural use of symbols, frame resonance, and 
diagnostic/prognostic frames in order to demonstrate how ideology plays a part in social 
mobilization. Snow’s theory of framing came from a modification of Goffman’s concept which 
stated that organizations use “primary framing” in the attempt to “allows its user to locate, 
perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its 
terms.”[4] Goffman originally picked up the term “framing” from Bateson’s use in the field of 
psychology where the definitions of a situation are “built up in accordance with principles of 
organization which govern events-at least social ones-and our subjective involvement in them” 
and ‘frame’ is used in reference to these basic elements.[5]  
What Benford and Snow brought to this dialogue, argues McAdam et al., was the more refined 
definition of framing, referring to it as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to 
fashion a shared understanding of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate 
collective action.”[6] McAdam, et. al., acknowledged that framing processes encourage 
mobilization as they define the problems and vulnerability of the system and its illegitimacy in a 
definition.  
Benford and Snow identify four common characteristics to collective action frames that will aid in 
focusing this study. These characteristics are: problem identification and direction/locus of 
attribution, flexibility and rigidity/ inclusivity and exclusivity, interpretive scope and influence, and 
degree of resonance. Problem identification and direction/locus of attribution is considered as the 
“most obvious”[7] way in which frames vary. Gerhards and Rucht studied West German 
mobilization campaigns in the late 1980s and they hypothesized that “the larger the range of 
problems covered by a frame, the larger the range of social groups that can be addressed with 
the frame and the greater the mobilization capacity of the frame.”[8] They add the caveat to their 
hypothesis that it only holds to those frames that can be logically or plausibly connected to each 
other. With flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity, Benford and Snow explain that the 
more inclusive and flexible frames are, the more likely they can become “master frames.”[9] 
Master frames are those that are broader in scope and influence and act as a kind of blueprint for 
the orientation and activities of other movements. According to Swart, “frames that have been 
adopted by two or more distinctive movement… exist not only because of [their] qualities but also 
because they are culturally resonant to their historical milieu.[10] The transportation of master 
frames affects U.S. IO and PSYOP as new master frames appear from outlying movements in the 
Middle East from Iran’s nuclear program to Hezbollah’s victory over Israel in the 2006 Summer 
War.  
The degree of resonance is the fourth way in which frames can vary. Two factors are identified by 
Benford and Snow as key to the variance in degree of frame resonance: credibility of the frame 
itself and its relative salience. The credibility of a frame is a function of its consistency, empirical 
credibility, and the credibility of the frame articulators. Inconsistency in a frame can be found in 
contradictions between the frame and beliefs or claims, and in the popular perception of the 
frame articulators, whether or not their frame conflicts with their tactical actions. Empirical 
credibility has to do with whether or not the frame can be verified by common experience, or be 
proven through logical discourse. The credibility of the articulators ties into empirical credibility. 
The corroboration of experts with social status on a movement-worthy issue creates credibility of 
fact, since the experts are assumed to know about their area of expertise, and the relatively ‘elite’ 
or known qualities of the articulating individual lend credibility to the movement. Benson and 
Snow use the example of peace groups enlisting former members of the Department of Defense, 
such as Admiral Eugene Carroll, Daniel Ellsberg, and John Stockwell, to speak at rallies in order 
to enhance the movement’s credibility.[11]  
The salience of a frame has to do with its capacity to move through a society at multiple levels, 
not just through one sub-culture or compartment of society. Benford and Snow identify three 
dimensions: centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. Johnston writes that a 
frame must have amplification, which directly describes a frame’s salience. He illustrates 
amplification with the bumper sticker; pithy, catchy slogans that cut to the argument in memorable, 
striking, and fundamental ways. His examples are from the issue of abortion in the United States: 
“I’m Pro-Choice and I Vote,” “It’s a Child Not a Choice,” “Keep Your Hands off My Body,” and 
“Abortion Is Murder.”[12] These simple yet direct statements leave no question in the mind of any 
person who is even remotely aware of the issue as to what side the bearer (or driver) ascribes. 
These simple statements divide the line of battle between the rights of citizens, natural rights as 
argued by Locke and Jefferson and codified in the U.S. Constitution, and the Judeo-Christian 
ethical understanding of the sanctity of life.  
Johnston and Noakes attempt to simplify academic work on framing by defining frame resonance 
as consisting of the frame makers (what they called the social movement entrepreneur), the 
frame receivers, and the frame itself (which Kubal defines as, of necessity, being in the styles, 
forms, and normative codes of the target audience).[13] Cutting terms and combining nuances 
makes the memorization of key tenants of framing easier for the student; however, the nuances 
exist for a reason: framing is a nuanced concept. From these sources and the academic dialogue 
that they encouraged, a complete understanding of the concept of framing can be applied in this 
study, but it must be understood that the ‘answer’ to a definition of framing is, by the very nature 
of framing, that it is not an exact science. The variance in academic studies, proliferation of 
writing and additions to jargon and terminology can make the study of framing daunting. The 
extraction of hard numbers from frame analysis is more time-consuming than potentially fruitful; 
however, one can build the argument, as I will hereafter, that the application of the study of 
framing can help military operations in stability support operations (SASO) engaging in the 
counterinsurgency fight.  
Islamic Framing and Social Movements  
Central to the U.S. Army’s fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)are the Islamist leaders’ uses of 
framing in respect to Jihad. The concept of Jihad is a religious concept used to mobilize a society 
to conduct religious warfare against an oppressive regime, or, more typically, against a non-
Muslim or apostate occupying power. When framing Jihad, religious leaders rely on a rich 
historical religious dialogue based on the right leader for, the correct time to conduct, and the 
correct impetus to wage Jihad from Qur’anic sources and from later Muslim scholarship. Their 
argument is powerful and focused towards a particular target audience (TA) at a particular time. 
This section will briefly show how framing is applied in Islamist leaders’ efforts to win popular 
support.  
Islamist leaders turn Islam political in order to create a social movement based on religious 
identity that has had great effect on Muslim versus non-Muslim powers such as in Israel and in 
Lebanon. Islamic activism is a formidable adversary to U.S. military operations, especially in the 
information operations arena where they hold the ‘high-ground’ of cultural understanding, 
immediate common identity, and the trust of their religious followers. The following section applies 
framing to Islamic activism and will provide a definition of terms and a general application by 
academics in this field of study. The work of Williams, Kubal, Benford, and Snow form a 
conceptual academic understanding of framing in a cultural context not specific to the Muslim 
world. The works of Wiktorowicz, Robinson, Gurr and Hafez will then help apply the concept of 
framing to the Muslim situation in particular; each author addresses social movement leading to 
warfare and how leaders use framing to justify their actions within culturally legal bounds.  
Benford and Snow argue that the proliferation of scholarship on collective action frames and 
framing processes demonstrates the growing regard for this aspect of social mobilization theories 
as a vital dynamic alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity processes.[14] 
Studying framing and its manifestations helps to further understanding of the issues relevant to 
the society, culture and temper of a given community. Islamic scholars have a rich background of 
academic work from which to extrapolate arguments and apply the religion to current day 
problems, and Jihad is only one of many topics of discussion. Islamists in particular have, of 
necessity, opened their own schools to train their own scholars at as high a level of competence 
as their religious, social, and political opponents. In order to disseminate their message and form 
a social base from which to influence politics, Islamists have to match wits in a highly competitive 
religious academic atmosphere.  
The Islamists’ measure of effectiveness in this academic arena is their ability to manipulate doubt 
in the opposition and then fill this void with their own message. Doubt in the opposition is brought 
about through framing. The idea of framing comes from social mobilization theory, it is a tactic 
used by movement leaders to rally support for their cause while simultaneously preventing other 
leaders from ‘bleeding’ their ranks of members. The message used by the framing leader is 
intended to create resonance, defined by Williams and Kubal as when “frames used by activists 
fit within the existing repertoire of legitimate ideological constructions” thus providing the 
movement activists with the cultural resources to dominate the public perceptions on a particular 
issue.[15] The hope is therefore that the population that will, in turn, be convinced to be led by 
these activists. Wiktorowicz argues that Muslim leaders are often hindered not by religious facts 
to support their arguments either for or against Jihad; rather, these leaders, when framing, utilize 
four basic strategies to promote their group of clerics and debunk the credibility of the opposition. 
These strategies are: 1. vilification or demonizing the oppositions’ popular clerics, 2. exaltation or 
praise for the “in-group” clerics, 3. credentialing, the emphasis placed on the particular expertise 
of the in-group’s intellectuals, and 4. de-credentialing, or raising doubts as to the oppositions’ 
clerics.[16]  
Wiktorowicz makes the astute observation that, since there is no formal hierarchy within the 
Muslim world, the religious interpretation within the community is subject to the intellectual 
experts that are commonly or particularly favored by the community. Unlike the Catholic Church, 
there is not a living supreme pontiff (an exception to this rule: Twelve Shi’a have the Hidden 
Imam whose guidance will trump all other religious expertise once he returns) with the 
organization and authority to control religious doctrine. The academic requirements of a jurist are 
not codified and the title alim or religious scholar is not a formal designation or appointment. 
Therefore, when fatwas are issued, the Muslim community at large relies on the perceived 
character and competence of the scholar to determine legitimacy.[17] It is therefore the nature of 
Islamic scholarship to rest on the popular perception of the scholar in question, which lends this 
scholarship particularly susceptible to framing.  
The study of framing does not come without detractors. As Williams and Kubal point out, framing 
is overtly focused on the elites in a movement, what they say and how they organize their 
campaign of words, and the fact that most framing scholarship has maintained its focus at the 
interpersonal level and not at the elite level.[18] In effect, problem with culture, and therefore 
framing, is finding a balance between the “influence and processes of the active agency of human 
actors and the structuring power of cultural forms.”[19] The primary problem with scholarship on 
framing is the lack of focus on the macro-culture and its overwhelming focus on interpersonal 
resonance.[20] Though critical of some of the scholarship around framing, Williams and Kubal are 
far from throwing the whole concept out. Rather, they point out some of the failures of frames 
within the United States’ history (such as Marxism and Labor Rights) and relate it to the failure of 
the movement leaders to apply the intended message to the greater American culture and social 
ethics regarding labor and rights. Their application of framing to its failures only furthers the 
understanding of framing influence on a social movement, especially when these frames are not 
in sync with the popular demands for social change.  
Frames, whether intrinsically powerful or not, have to be targeted at social desires, cultural 
triggers, and a common social problem that a sizeable group of the population demand to see 
solved. Why people activate, revolt, and form social movements is an important question in 
understanding the frames used in creating movements. Gurr introduced the concept of relative 
deprivation which argued that men rebel due to economic reasons. Hafez argues to the contrary 
that Muslims rebel due to a “defensive reaction to predatory state repression that threatens the 
organizational resources and lives of political Islamists.”[21] Hafez’s research focuses on the 
Islamist movements in the Middle East and North Africa and finds this commonality that is 
specifically within the Qur’anic construct of Jihad.  
U.S. Military Application: Al Anbar Province, Iraq, 2004-07  
Al Anbar Province is seated at the southwestern point of the ‘Sunni Triangle of Death,’ as it has 
been labeled by the media. It was a hotbed of support for Saddam Hussein and includes the 
cities of (from West to East) Hit, Ramadi, Habbinaya, and Fallujah. Al Anbar is the largest 
province in Iraq and its terrain consists of the Euphrates River basin and desert. Demographically, 
al Anbar is mostly Sunni, with some Kurdish settlements and Shi’a neighborhoods. The relative 
lack of sectarian differences poses the threat of easy unification of the society under an insurgent 
cause and the promise of simplicity in composing IO talking points and PSYOP messages for the 
U.S. forces. Al Anbar shares borders with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria, which makes it much 
more susceptible to foreign influence. Al Ramadi and Fallujah are settled along a direct highway 
to Jordan and Syria and have a long history of smuggling with the neighboring states that has 
posed a threat to the growth and maintenance of indigenous police and security forces in al 
Anbar.[22]  
The Second Battle of Fallujah: November 2004  
The importance of the second battle of Fallujah is not simply that it was another high-intensity 
contact between the insurgent and U.S. forces; rather, the battle was a fusion of IO and 
maneuver that was developed after the first attempt to take Fallujah, without an IO plan, failed 
miserably to quell the insurgency or impose U.S./Coalition Forces (CF) messages throughout the 
region. The first battle, in fact, actually reinforced the frames of the insurgents and clerical leaders 
who had made the town ungovernable by the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) or CF.  
The first attempt on Fallujah began in April 2004 with a cordon of the city and weak attempts to 
coax the fledgling Iraqi security forces to attack hardened insurgent positions. The rapid response 
of the IIG/Bremer government to the execution of four U.S. contractors left little time to plan and 
little desire to attack on the part of the maneuver commanders who received the order to assault 
the city resulting in a hastily constructed and resourced attack called Operation Vigilant Resolve. 
Essentially, the task force assembled had had little time to plan, coordinate, or research the best 
way to take the town, minimize civilian casualties, and nullify the leadership of the clerics who 
were leading the insurgents from within the city.[23] Even though the U.S./CF had clear military 
dominance against the insurgents in Fallujah during Operation Vigilant Resolve, the operation 
was a failure because “operations in the information domain were not integrated into the battle 
plan.”[24] Steps to integrate IO into the battle plan would have included “engaging numerous and 
varied Iraqi leaders, removing enemy information centers, and rapidly disseminating information 
from the battlefield to worldwide media.”[25]  
The mistakes made in Operation Vigilant Resolve were avoided in the Second Battle of Fallujah, 
code named Operation Al Fajr (New Dawn). The operation was planed and coordinated under the 
auspices of Iraqi leadership and taken with IO in mind. The planners at Multi National Corps-Iraq 
(MNC-I) created the “IO threshold” in order to prevent another informational defeat. The planners 
knew that the best way to prepare the battlefield was not through conventional artillery and air 
strikes; rather, it would be through gaining a dominant position on the information battlefield and 
nullifying the insurgent leadership through coercing them to leave or proving them wrong. The 
very name of the operation, Al-Fajr, was chosen because it put an Iraqi face on the assault and 
was intended to leave no doubt in the mind of the enemy that the attack had the license of the IIG.  
I have first-hand experience with the Second Battle of Fallujah as a Mechanized Infantry 
Company Fire Support Officer (FSO) and was a part of the planning and execution of lethal and 
non-lethal fires used during the battle. For example, my company was augmented with a Forward 
Air Controller (or FAC, which is a pilot trained to call in air-strikes from the ground) and a PSYOP 
loudspeaker team prepared to play harassment and non-intervention messages throughout the 
battle. Throughout our time in Fallujah, the company sought to fight the insurgents and provide for 
the civilians who had stayed. We provided medical aid to wounded civilians, license to come and 
go along the streets to families trying to get to their homes, and security from insurgent reprisal.  
The importance of IO was evident during the preparation for the battle. Prior to the attack, the IO 
plan was briefed down to the platoon and squad level with each unit knowing their part and the 
restrictions on their actions that were emplaced in order to win a victory not just over the fighters, 
but over the insurgency in the area. The purpose of the attack was not to destroy the city; rather it 
was to remove the insurgents. Several weeks prior to the initial attack, leaflets had been dropped 
and a ‘whisper campaign’ initiated that warned fighters in Fallujah that the Iraqi and U.S. forces 
were going to attack. Many of the insurgents and leaders fled the impending invasion, but, more 
importantly for CF, so did many of the civilians which would vastly reduce the chances of 
collateral damage. The commander’s intent was to raise the IO threshold and gain the ‘high 
ground’ of information, not just the temporary control of the city.  
“Using this intent as a guideline, MNF-I, MNC-I, and Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) 
developed courses of action to mass effects in the information domain, thereby raising the IO 
threshold and creating additional ‘maneuver’ room for combat operations in Fallujah. We 
deliberately countered enemy information campaigning, planned and executed IO shaping 
operations, and executed carefully planned senior leader engagements, military diplomacy, and 
public diplomacy, and public diplomacy activities. As a result of these synchronized, integrated, 
and complementary actions, we were able to mass information effects and build a strong base of 
support for combat operations in advance of the operation.”[26]  
1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT)-1st Armored Division (AD) in Ramadi 2006-7  
Under the command of COL MacFarland, 1-1AD has been primarily recognized as the unit that 
helped to turn Ramadi from one of the most violent areas in Iraq into a success story for U.S.-
Iraqi combined COIN operations. His method is surprisingly simple: first he regained control of the 
town through kinetic operations. He ordered his subordinate battalion commanders to break out 
of the Brigade and Battalion sized Forward Operating Bases and create smaller, platoon sized, 
combat outposts throughout the city. Next, he enlisted the support of Iraqi forces, Army and police, 
and the support of the sheikhs to launch information operations in the area. Finally, he emplaced 
a system wherein the CF’s voice could be heard above the threats and messages of the 
insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) forces’ voices. This system is called the TAVWAVE system 
and it is basically a sort of closed circuit radio-broadcasting system with a centralized 
broadcasting station controlled by U.S. and Iraqi security forces that broadcasts to large speakers 
secured within each of the platoon-sized combat outposts and the Iraqi police stations around the 
city. These speakers broadcasted alerts for CF operations, daily news, and alerts to AQI activities 
within the area.[27] Previously, AQI had held the ‘high-ground’ of information operations; they 
would simply talk to the people and inform them that the CF were conducting all the attacks in the 
area, causing all the damage to infrastructure, buildings, and civilian casualties and that AQI’s 
forces were the ones providing for the population of Ramadi.  
Essential to the use of the TACWAVE system is the cultural repertoire that it intrinsically built on: 
namely the local custom of receiving news from mosque loudspeakers.[28] The TACWAVE 
enabled CF to begin daily interaction with the populace and established the Iraqi police and army 
as legitimate authorities in the area. The fact that 1-1AD used local Iraqis to broadcast on the 
radio gave further legitimacy to cooperative local leaders, such as the chief of police, and by-
passed the awkward differences in Iraqi dialect that CF interpreters used. This integration of IO 
uses tenants of the concept of framing but had to be brought about in a slow and painstaking way. 
The success of the TACWAVE system and the employment of information in Ramadi by 1-1AD 
happened in spite of the Army organization; it was not brought about because of doctrine, training, 
or standard operating procedures (SOPs) inherent in the CF organization.[29]  
Conclusion  
In this paper I covered the concept of framing, briefly how it is evident in Islamist leadership, 
where it can be applied to U.S. military operations and doctrine and have concluded that the 
concept can and should be applied to U.S. military doctrine. At the very least, a more in-depth list 
of references including Benford and Snow, Hafez, Schleifer, and other academics should 
accompany COIN related manuals so that Soldiers and Marines may explore the field of study 
and get a feel for the nuances in the field. The U.S. Armed Forces are well equipped, trained, and 
mentally prepared for conventional warfare and have proven itself as a supreme power in this 
regard, even against a weakened enemy such as Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have proven 
their conventional capacity to the world. The problem is that the current operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have moved beyond the conventional scheme of fires and maneuver and into a 
peace-keeping, stability and support, counter-insurgency operations that have been kept well 
outside the doctrinal and professional dialogue since Vietnam.[30]  
In light of the doctrinal gap, social mobilization theory, and framing in particular, stands at the 
forefront of academic disciplines that can immediately help foster an understanding of counter-
insurgency operations conducted by a coalition of occupying foreign troops and fledgling 
indigenous security forces. The focus that framing places on the messaging, leadership and 
cultural repertoire used by insurgent organizations to rally support from the population can better 
align conventionally organized U.S. forces to attend to the true center of gravity in military 
operation within Iraq; namely the civilian population. Controlling the flow of information, e.g. the 
frames produced and countered by the insurgency, reduces the supply chains of the enemy and 
constricts his ability to operate, as demonstrated in al Anbar Province since 2006. To deny 
Soldiers and Marines on the ground the tools to accomplish their mission by omitting or 
neglecting a key concept—that of framing—is to increase the probability of defeat.  
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